

Democracy and Bureaucracy: A Bibliometrics Comparative Analysis on the Developed and Developing Countries

Delila Putri Saday¹

¹Department of Government Science, Universitas Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa, Indonesia.

delila.putri@untirta.ac.id

Jonah Silas²

²Department of Government Science, Universitas Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa, Indonesia.

jonah.silas@untirta.ac.id

ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the development of democratic and bureaucratic theories that occur in developed and developing countries. The author identifies this research by analyzing journal articles that are indexed by Scopus as journals with reputable and accountable research outputs. The Scopus database was used as data in this study. This study uses a comparative qualitative method of analysis by comparing documents published in developed and developing countries. The results of this study show that; 1) The development of research related to democracy and bureaucracy based on the Scopus database has decreased significantly in 2017-2020, increased in 2021 and decreased again in 2022. 2) The predominance of research related to democracy and bureaucracy occurs in the United States, where the country is a full-fledged democracy. 3) The connectedness of the study during 2015-2022 is divided into 8 clusters, each cluster displays a comparison of countries with the interconnectedness between countries involved in the research. 4) The high weberianess of the state bureaucracy is due to the professional public administration before democracy combined with electoral competition and non-ethnic politics. Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan are examples. Argentine hyper-presidentialism exacerbates top-down politicization of public administration and personalist patronage

Keywords: Democracy and Bureaucracy, Bibliometric Analysis, Developed and Developing Countries

INTRODUCTION

To have a strong and efficient government, it is necessary to have a public bureaucracy that has been built in line with the Weberian concept(Stivers, 2018). The quality of the Weberian bureaucracy is that it is rule-bound, merit-based, and objective. On the contrary, personal reciprocity and clientelism form the foundation of the existing relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in a system based on patronage. According to Max Weber, there are two different types of bureaucracy in which the state can be legitimized: one based on merit, and the other based on patronage(Meier, 2019). Since the patronage system is associated with a lack of professional competence, partiality, and reward, the Weberian civil service is more likely to be seen as rational and effective. Nonetheless, political appointments and merit-based recruitment can both be found in public administration at all levels in the modern political system. It is not uncommon for the highest level of government and public organizations to be responsible for making

promises like this. In addition, politicians have the ability to exercise control over the formulation and implementation of public policies through the work of appointments made at their own discretion (Ouziel, 2020). The process of professionalization within the state bureaucracy is a multifaceted phenomenon, and countries that have just undergone a democratic transformation are an excellent example. As a direct consequence of this, one of the most debated debates today is about the relationship between democracy and effective governance.

when there is a low level of democracy, "the impact of democracy on the capacity of the state is negative." Its influence is absent and very favorable for the democratic participation of the middle and high levels (Gilad & Alon-Barkat, 2018). The opposite perspective is that the quality of the current bureaucracy depends on whether the state is professionalized before it is opened to wider involvement in the democratic process. On the other hand, there are many who argue that the relationship between statehood and democracy is much more nuanced than that shown by sequential approaches. According to the findings of other studies, the quality of the bureaucracy is influenced by the extent to which elections are contested and by the organization of political parties. Is there a relationship between the level of "weberianess" displayed by young democracies and the stages of development they experience? There may be conjunctural and comparable phenomena at play, if a person believes ideas that have not been discussed in the relevant research bodies. This suggests that the various explanatory components need to be combined to describe the causal pattern, and that there may be more than one combination of causal conditions connected with the same event. There seems to be no high level of bureaucratic weberianity at the moment (Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014).

Empirical research was conducted on developing countries experiencing democratic transitions as part of the third wave of new industrialized countries. To find a solution to the problems that have been posed by the study, the authors use a method known as fuzzyset qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), which has never been applied in this capacity before (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). The analytical approach of QCA and the research strategy are both well suited for the purpose of finding the components that are ultimately responsible for producing interesting results (Ragin, 2008; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). in addition to investigating several routes that all end up producing the same results (Vis, 2012). In causal case studies such as process tracking, which addresses causal complexity, equivalence, and asymmetry, the absence of counterfactual variations makes it impossible to make a statement about need or adequacy.

Despite the fact that these studies do address this issue, statements about need and adequacy are unlikely to be made. The QCA results are used as a reference for conducting in-depth case studies, which explore reasonable explanations for the revealed causal pathways (Gilad & Alon-Barkat, 2018). The results of the study contribute to the body of existing knowledge by pointing out the shortcomings of currently accepted hypotheses and showing potential avenues for further investigation. They achieve this by determining the extent to which theoretical predictions are supported by actual facts. Since our research is based on deterministic ontology, we can refute the idea that the institutionalization of the party system is necessary for the survival of the Weberian bureaucracy in the new democracy. Moreover, the QCA results do not indicate that the presence of professional

public administration before democracy is necessary or sufficient for the desired outcome (Thomann & Ege, 2020). Electoral competitiveness is considered important to the outcome; however, when ethnic politics is incorporated into the equation, this does not reflect the same conclusions as before(Rihoux et al., 2011).

This study aims to analyze the development of theories related to democracy and bureaucracy in developing and developed countries. Democracy and Bureaucracy are one of the main issues of countries in the world in carrying out the sustainability of a country's government . Through the QCA method the author analyzes a comparison of theories that develop in developed and developing countries related to the analysis of problems related to democracy and bureaucracy. Through this bibliometric comparative analysis , it can provide an overview of the development of democratic and bureaucratic theory in developing and developed countries.

METHOD

This study uses qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) research methods with data analysis techniques to determine logical conclusions based on supporting data sets(Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). The use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis is used in this study to analyze in depth related to the development of democratic and bureaucratic theory during the period 2015-2022. The data used in this study used data from Scopus with a total dataset of 385 obtained from the scopus database related to Democracy and Bureaucracy. The data obtained is then collected in analysis using the help of Vosviewer software so that it can be used in Qualitative Comparative Analysis(Thomann & Maggetti, 2020).

RESULT

This study aims to analyze the development of theories related to democracy and bureaucracy in developing and developed countries. The following are the results of research developments obtained from the Scopus database.




Figure 1. Number of documents by year

Based on figure 1 shows that the number of publications from the Scopus database looks volatile during 2015-2022. The development of research related to bureaucracy and democracy in figure 1 shows the development of theories relevant to bureaucracy and democracy. In 2017-2020 research related to democracy and bureaucracy experienced a significant decline, until 2021 it increased from 40 literature to 50 literature. However, in 2022 as of July it has decreased to 20 literature. This shows that the existence of research on bureaucracy and democracy has decreased interest. On the other hand bureaucracy and democracy have an interdependent relationship with a state.




Figure 2. Amount of Dokumen by Country/Territory

Figure 2 shows the distribution of research related to democracy and bureaucracy in the world. Jumla's highest publication in the United States was 134 the highest compared to other countries. This shows the development of research conducted predominantly in the United States. The dominance of this research occurs in the United States which belongs to developed democracies and has a uniqueness in its government. The United States has a good democracy index of 7.85 in the full democracy category. North America (Canada and U.S.) is the top-ranked region in the Democracy Index with an average score of 8.36, but this dropped significantly from 8.58 in 2020. The following are the results of the visualization of research connections between countries which are divided into 8 analysis clusters.




Figure 3. The dominant state division cluster in the development of democratic and bureaucratic theory

Based on figure 3, it shows the development of research related to democracy and bureaucracy which is analyzed based on state-based analysis clusters. This analysis cluster shows the connectedness of research carried out based on the dominance or frequent appearance in research conducted in various countries in the world. The results of this study analysis show that there are eight clusters that can be seen in table 1.

Table 1. The dominant state division cluster in the development of democratic and bureaucratic theory

Cluster 1	Bangladesh, Canada, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Portugal, Singapore
Cluster 2	Denmark, Indonesia, Pakistan, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey
Cluster 3	China, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Spain
Cluster 4	India, New Zealand, Poland, Switzerland, United State
Cluster 5	Argentina, Brazil, Netherlands, United Kingdom

Cluster 6	Australia, Austria, Belgium, France
Cluster 7	Norway, Russian Federation
Cluster 8	South Africa

DISCUSSION

In practice, bureaucracy and democracy have a very intimate relationship with one another. The concepts of bureaucracy and democracy are frequently seen as being in opposition to one another. This paradox is true on both the professional and the everyday levels. On the one hand, a significant role in efficient public administration is played by the public bureaucracy(La Porte et al., 2002).

On the other hand, the bureaucracy is seen as being too legalistic, and it pays little attention to the needs and desires of individual residents. In common parlance, the term "bureaucracy" refers to something that is hierarchical, and sometimes even dictatorial systems of governance. This continues to occur despite the establishment of a bureaucracy whose primary purpose is to democratically implement the policies that have already been decided upon(Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014).

Although it seems counterintuitive, the connection between bureaucracy and democracy is actually one of complementarity. In a sense, it is paradoxical that a well-functioning bureaucracy is essential to the success of democratic governments. In order for a democratic state to operate effectively, the unyielding archetypes that are commonly associated in a bad light with the bureaucracy are in fact required(Chaskin, 2005; Peters, 2010).

It's possible that the ideas of bureaucracy and democracy sound mutually exclusive to you. On the other hand, you can't have one without the other if you want to have a government that is efficient and responsive(Farazmand, 2010; Tiwari, 2012). Both of these things are beneficial to society. The adaptability of democratic administration needs to be weighed against the predictability and agnosticism of bureaucratic organizations. In a similar vein, democratic procedures are essential for legitimizing the government process and producing legislation that really reflects the desires of the populace(Gilad & Alon-Barkat, 2018; Sengar, 2019). It is necessary for effective administration that bureaucracy and democracy have a complimentary relationship.

There are three tendencies that are experienced by each worker. The first is the weberization process, which is a process in which a bureaucracy is growing closer to the kind of ideal as expressed by Max Weber(Kirilmaz, 2020; Meier et al., 2019). The second is the tendency for employees to become more and more hierarchical. Second, the process of parkinsonization is defined as the following: the process by which workers tend to enter a pathological condition, as C. Northcote Parkinson firmly believed it would happen in the past: Third, the orwelization process, also known as the inclination of workers who are employed by the community, which in Indonesia most likely leans more toward

parkinsonization and orwelization than weberization(Farhang, 2018; Nwoba & Nwokwu, 2018).

High weberianess of state bureaucracies in selected nations is attributable to professional public administration before democracy combined with electoral rivalry and non-ethnic politics(Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014; de Avila Gomide, 2022). Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan are examples. Brazil exemplifies firstsolution's formula. The country's central administration and political parties are more outside than inside the organized party system. Grindle (2010, 2012) notes that Brazil began ending patronage in the late 1930s, during the Vargas government. After this, administrative changes professionalized the civil service (e.g., the 1967 reform conducted by the military).

Despite the patronage system and increasing career structure, the democratic Constitution of 1998 incorporated meritocratic public servant recruitment (Grindle, 2010).⁶ This may explain the bureaucracy's steadiness and professionalism. Grindle (2010) notes that the civil service continues to provide personal appointments outside the career structure (*cargos em comisso*), and not just at the top level of governments and public bodies. Fragmented party structure makes it difficult for presidents to create parliamentary majorities. In Brazil, politicians employ patronage to pass measures (Praça et al., 2011). Election competitiveness and no ethnic politics are required for bureaucratic weberianess. South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil's democratic processes lacked ethnic politics. The three instances are highelectoral competition cases(Gilad & Alon-Barkat, 2018; Ouziel, 2020).

The South Korean and Taiwanese instances confirm Shefter's (1994) and Fukuyama's (2014) claim that introducing democracy in a merit-based bureaucracy does not lead to political rivals offering government jobs for votes. The scholarship on authoritarian developing governments' performance in Asian Tigers has investigated Weberian traits (Evans, 1995). Hellmann (2020) and Templeman (2020) show that the advent of democracy originally reduced state capacity in South Korea and Taiwan because election rivalry increased politicians' and parties' incentives to participate in particularistic activities. After maturity, democratic institutions strengthened the state's ability to guard against elites' limited interests.

Non-institutionalized party systems, ethnic politics, ethnic conflicts, and electoral rivalry, or the lack of professional public service before democracy and political competition suggest low bureaucratic weberianess in the analyzed nations(Meier, 2019; Stivers, 2018). Thailand and Indonesia are first-solution examples, Malaysia second, and Argentina, Mexico, and the Philippines third. Argentina, Mexico, and the Philippines are outside high Weberian bureaucracies. At democratization, these nations hadn't yet consolidated a professional civil service, according to Scopus dataset. As noted, these countries have more trouble developing a rational-legal administration than those that inherited it from authoritarian periods.

The 1957 Argentine Constitution curtailed patronage by providing employment security for civil officials, but under the 1976 dictatorship, the military utilized patronage to recolonize public government with military personnel. The military administration increased the public sector until 1983, producing civilian and military jobs. With the

restoration to democracy, public positions have become a way to reward party loyalists, and public service hasn't changed significantly.

Panizza et al. (2018) say Argentina's hyper-presidentialism exacerbates top-down politicization of public administration and personalist patronage. According to the authors, Argentine civil service difficulties are worse in the country's political climate, defined by power alternations between divided Peronist and anti-Peronist ideological blocs. Regarding Mexico, the PRI-dominated authoritarian dictatorship lasted 71 years and built a system of clientelism that began in the presidential office and expanded across the public sector (Grindle, 2010).

Public sector jobs stabilized the regime in this arrangement. The patronage system hasn't changed since the PRI lost Congress in 1997 and the president in 2000. (Grindle, 2012). Congress authorized a career service in 2003. Despite new legislation, the patronage system persisted due to political obstacles. Hicken (2018) says that despite installing democratic institutions in the Philippines, the US did nothing to develop a professional bureaucracy. Political and economic dominance remained pervasive among landowning elites, or oligarchs, and they patronized clientelistic networks worldwide (Hicken, 2018). The public bureaucracy lost its political impartiality during Marcos (1972-1986). (Rebullida & Serrano, 2006). Democratization formalized public service to Weberian ideas. Despite these attempts, the Philippine bureaucracy is considered as a group of political elites. According to Hodder (2018), informal presidential and legislative influence on nominations is a major concern. High voter volatility means a flexible party system in the Philippines (Hicken, 2018). In an unstable party system, parties have short time horizons, making patronage more plausible.

Malaysia had a cohesive and robust bureaucracy before democratization, but it's now beyond Weberian structures. Doneret al. (2005) indicated that state bureaucracy recruitment during the country's authoritarian period was based on competitive exams and merit. Despite this, ethnic politics has been Malaysia's main difficulty since independence, according to Chin (2011). After democratization, ethnic conflict in the political system suggested that each group (Malaysians, Chinese, and Indians) sought an edge over the other. Establishing recruitment quotas for the administrative elite contributed to the progressive dominance of Malays. From the 1970s to the 2000s, the ethnic makeup of the entire public service grew from 60.8% Malay, 20.2% Chinese, 17.4% Indian, and 1.6% others to 77.3%, 9.4%, 5.1%, and 7.8%, respectively (Chin, 2011). If ethnic groups favor reforming the civil service to make it more responsible and professional, Malay support would drop if the changes involve opening the public service to non-Malays. Civil services are a historic political and employment source for Malay people (Chin, 2011; Lim, 2007). Thailand had a significant bureaucracy before democratization; today, it's outside the high Weberian bureaucracies set.

During military control, decisions were determined within the bureaucracy, without external factors like political parties. The bureaucracy was influential and privileged then (Bowornwathana, 2011). After democratization, Thailand's absence of an established party structure may explain why it's almost absent from Weberian bureaucracies. Thai officials must strengthen their network relationships to endure

uncertain political shifts, according to Bow-ornwathana (2011). Neher (1996) contends that poorly established political institutions (such as political parties, legislatures, etc.) make personal relationships vital to the country's state bureaucracy. Berenschot (2018a) analyzes how Indonesia's democratization failed to develop merit-based bureaucracy. The country is outside Weberian bureaucracy. According to the author, Indonesian bureaucratic reforms failed because elections sparked rivalry for state resources. Because political parties aren't institutionalized, bureaucrats oversee the allocation of state resources. This, he says, forces politicians to utilize bureaucratic obligations to obtain campaign support and control over state resources. Berenschot (2018b) says candidates use clientelistic networks due to Indonesian political parties' lack mobilizational potential. Politicians must engage with local elites, especially bureaucrats. In exchange, they guarantee access to state resources including business licenses, government contracts, and jobs. Clientelism and patronage drive political campaigns.

CONCLUSION

The connection between democracy and bureaucracy is one of complementarity. In a sense, it is paradoxical that a well-functioning bureaucracy is essential to the success of democratic governments. It is necessary for effective administration that bureaucracy and democracy have a complimentary relationship. High weberianess of state bureaucracies in selected nations is attributable to professional public administration before democracy combined with electoral rivalry and non-ethnic politics. Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan are examples.

Non-institutionalized party systems, ethnic politics, ethnic conflicts, or the lack of professional public service before democracy and political competition suggest low Weberianess. Argentina's hyper-presidentialism exacerbates top-down politicization of public administration and personalist patronage. In Mexico, the PRI-dominated authoritarian dictatorship lasted 71 years and built a system of clientelism that began in the presidential office and expanded across the public sector. Ethnic politics has been Malaysia's main difficulty since independence. Ethnic conflict in the political system suggested that each group (Malaysians, Chinese, and Indians) sought an edge over the other. Thailand's absence of an established party structure may explain why it's almost absent from Weberian bureaucracy.

REFERENCES

Berg-Schlosser, D., De Meur, G., Rihoux, B., & Ragin, C. C. (2009). Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as an approach. *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*, 1, 18.

Chaskin, R. J. (2005). Democracy and bureaucracy in a community planning process. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 24(4), 408–419.

Dahlberg, S., & Holmberg, S. (2014). Democracy and bureaucracy: How their quality matters for popular satisfaction. *West European Politics*, 37(3), 515–537.

de Avila Gomide, A. (2022). Democracy and bureaucracy in newly industrialized countries: A systematic comparison between Latin America and East Asia. *Governance*, 35(1), 83–102.

Farazmand, A. (2010). Bureaucracy and democracy: A theoretical analysis. *Public Organization Review*, 10(3), 245–258.

Farhang, S. (2018). Legislating for Litigation: Delegation, Public Policy, and Democracy. *Calif. L. Rev.*, 106, 1529.

Gilad, S., & Alon-Barkat, S. (2018). Enhancing democracy via bureaucracy: Senior managers' social identities and motivation for policy change. *Governance*, 31(2), 359–380.

Kirilmaz, H. (2020). *The Role of Bureaucracy in Turkey's Democratization Process: One-Party Period and Transition to Multi-Party System*.

La Porte, T. M., Demchak, C. C., & De Jong, M. (2002). Democracy and bureaucracy in the age of the web: empirical findings and theoretical speculations. *Administration & Society*, 34(4), 411–446.

Meier, K. J. (2019). Theoretical frontiers in representative bureaucracy: New directions for research. *Perspectives on Public Management and Governance*, 2(1), 39–56.

Meier, K. J., Compton, M., Polga-Hecimovich, J., Song, M., & Wimpy, C. (2019). Bureaucracy and the failure of politics: Challenges to democratic governance. *Administration & Society*, 51(10), 1576–1605.

Nwoba, M. O. E., & Nwokwu, P. M. (2018). Democratization of public bureaucracy in Nigeria: Implications for civil service efficiency. *South East Journal of Political Science*, 4(1).

Ouziel, L. M. (2020). Democracy, bureaucracy, and criminal justice reform. *BCL Rev.*, 61, 523.

Peters, B. G. (2010). Bureaucracy and democracy. *Public Organization Review*, 10(3), 209–222.

Rihoux, B., Rezsöhazy, I., & Bol, D. (2011). Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in public policy analysis: an extensive review. *German Policy Studies*, 7(3), 9–82.

Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C. (2010). Standards of good practice in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets. *Comparative Sociology*, 9(3), 397–418.

Sengar, S. S. (2019). Administrative Discretion: Bureaucracy in Democracy. *Supremo Amicus*, 9, 308.

Stivers, C. (2018). *Democracy, bureaucracy, and the study of administration*. Routledge.

Thomann, E., & Ege, J. (2020). Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in public administration. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Thomann, E., & Maggetti, M. (2020). Designing research with qualitative comparative analysis (QCA): Approaches, challenges, and tools. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 49(2), 356–386.

Tiwari, A. K. (2012). Corruption, democracy and bureaucracy. *Theoretical and Applied Economics*, 9(9), 17.